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4ABSTRACT
Kerala is in the forefront of decentralisation of powers following
the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments. The existence of a large
number of health care, educational and other institutions in every
Panchayat in Kerala has necessitated decentralisation of every sector as
part of the overall decentralisation. The government order of 1995 has
transferred the health care institutions at various levels to the local self
government institutions (LSGI).
 This study seeks to analyse decentralisation of the health care
sector in Kerala and the associated problems as perceived by the elected
members. The study argues that three basic problems of decentralising
the health care sector, namely spill over effect, role and relevance of a
pre existing body (Hospital Development Committee or HDC), and the
level of minimum health care service to be provided by the health care
institutions, have not been adequately addressed.
The problem of benefit spill over is quite serious with regard to
the secondary health care services accessed from the Taluk Head Quarters
Hospitals, which have been brought under the Municipal Councils. The
problem arises from the concentration of hospital beds in municipal
towns. The system of "matching transfers" might address the problem
of benefit spill over but it will introduce a new problem owing to the
inequality in the distribution of hospital beds across the taluks of the
state. A separate fund on the lines of the "social investment" fund in
Columbia might address this problem. Alternatively, private health care
sector may be drawn in through a reimbursement scheme so as to ensure
a minimum level of service.
The presence of HDC in a decentralised system is difficult to
sustain. Its continuance comes in the way of a proper functioning and
accountability of the LSGI with regard to the provision of health care
services. How exactly the functions of HDC should be integrated with
the LSGI calls for further discussion.
JEL Classification :  I10, O2
Key Words: decentralisation, benefit  spillover, minimum level of service
51 Adopting the amendments soon after initiating Structural Adjustment Program
raises a question as to the relationship between the two.  Is there  a relationship?
It is a question worth pursuing.
I.  Introduction
India has a long history of experimenting with decentralisation.
The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments adopted in 1992 is a
watershed in the Indian decentralisation experiment1. These amendments
required the Indian States to delegate some administrative functions and
taxation powers to local bodies. Among the States, Kerala was in the
forefront of decentralisation of powers. It set up a committee to suggest
amendments to Kerala Panchayati Raj and Municipality Acts of 1994 to
make the decentralisation process more operational and comprehensive.
Parallel with the Committee’s work and the legislative moves to translate
these suggestions, the ruling Left Democratic Front involved the local
bodies in the formulation and implementation of the Ninth Five Year
Plan through a campaign.
Given the relatively large size of the population under the lowest
unit of local self-government institutions (LSGI)- the Village Panchayat-
and the existence of large number of health care, educational and other
institutions in every Panchayat, decentralisation of every sector becomes
6an important component of the overall decentralisation. Decentralisation
of these sectors, and in particular the health care sector, depends to a
large extent on the vision from the top and perception of the administrative
and political process from the bottom. A fairly clear idea of the vision
from the top may be had by an analysis of the statements of policy makers,
legislative measures passed, and administrative fiats issued. It is the
perception of the elected representatives at the level of the LSGIs and
the administrative functionaries, which will be instrumental in
operationalizing decentralisation at that level. This study seeks to analyse
decentralisation of the health care sector and the associated problems as
perceived by the elected members. The study confines itself to a
discussion of allopathic medical institutions. The study is based on
detailed interviews with a number of elected representatives from selected
locations, both rural and urban, and physicians working in the Primary
Health Centres and Taluk Hospitals. The study argues that three basic
problems of decentralising the health care sector, namely spill over effect,
role and relevance of a pre existing body (Hospital Development
Committee), and the level of minimum health care service to be provided
by the health care institutions, have not been adequately addressed.
The paper is organised in eight sections. Following this
introduction, Section 2 provides a brief account of the broad
decentralisation effort being made in Kerala and the situation with regard
to the decentralisation of the health care sector. Section 3 discusses the
problem of decentralisation in general and that of the health care sector
as perceived by the elected representatives and physicians working in
health care units. Section 4 analyses the problem of benefit spill over in
the context of concentration of hospital beds in municipal towns. Section
5 discusses the inequality in access to health care across the taluks of
Kerala. Section 6 takes up the question of Hospital Development
Committees in the decentralisation environment. Section 7 discusses the
7decentralisation experiences elsewhere in the world. Section 8 is the
conclusion.
2.  Decentralisation in Kerala
The left movement has played a major role in instituting a process
of decentralised planning and governance in the state of Kerala. There
were repeated attempts, largely initiated by the left- led governments, to
introduce legislative measures for political and administrative
decentralisation at various points of time- in 1957, 1967, 1979, and 1991.
However, these measures either proved to be stillborn or short lived
(Nagaraj 1979; Raj 1993). Political fragmentation and instability were
partly responsible for this. Perhaps, a more important reason for this
was that these efforts were largely confined to enacting legislation, with
no serious effort to institute popular, and representative administrative
structures below the state level to translate the legislative measures into
action (Isaac and Harilal 1997). The 1991 experiment went a step ahead
to form elected representative bodies at the district level called district
councils. The 1991-92 annual plan provided for an increased plan outlay
of Rs. 250 crores to be implemented by the newly formed district councils.
However, this experiment too was short lived. In the elections to the
state assembly held later in 1991, the left coalition lost power, and the
new government headed by the Congress Party “lost no time in amending
the legislation setting up district councils to such an extent that they
were totally emasculated” (Raj 1993).
The 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution in 1992 is a
watershed in that they left no room for the successive state legislatures
to change the LSGI according to their whims and fancies. They brought
about a uniform three-tier structure- district, block/taluk, and village- in
the rural areas. Only for small states with population less than two million
was the intermediate tier optional. The amendments also introduced the
8concept of township for smaller urban centres, that is, rural areas in the
process of urbanisation.
The Amendments stipulated that the LSGI were to have a uniform
5-year term and in the event of dissolution elections were to be held
within six months. The elections were to be organised by an independent
election commission. There was to be reservation for scheduled caste/
scheduled tribe in proportion to their population, and one-third reservation
for women, in membership and chairpersons at all levels. A separate
schedule was added to the Constitution (11th Schedule) listing 29 subjects
that could be devolved to the LSGI. Every state government was to
periodically appoint a state finance commission to determine the share
of state government revenues and sources for local revenue for LSGI, so
that they can carry out duties devolved to them.
The LSGIs were to be involved in planning: “The Constitution
assigns to the panchayat the function of planning for social justice and
economic development as the primary objective”. A new constitutionally
mandated structure, the District Planning Committee, was to be formed
in every district. Two-thirds of the membership of the Committee was
reserved for representatives of the District Panchayat and the urban local
self-governments.
The Left Democratic Government assumed power in May 1996
and making use of the opportunity provided by the constitutional
amendments initiated two moves towards effective decentralisation. The
very first move  even before passing the enabling legislation, was “to
empower the panchayats (rural local bodies) and municipal bodies to
draw up the Ninth Five Year Plan schemes within their respective areas
of responsibility”. The first step towards planning from below was the
People’s Campaign for Decentralised Planning initiated in August 1996.
9The campaign was conducted in a number of phases involving grama
sabhas -the lowest unit electing a representative- and ward conventions,
development seminars, task forces, and preparation of panchayat plans.
In the process a shelf of projects could be built up, prioritised and worked
into annual plans. The Planning Board has laid down certain broad
guidelines regarding the sectoral allocations to be made by the local
bodies. Despite these guidelines, “the tendency to choose certain preferred
projects- like roads, milch cattle distribution and drinking water, housing
etc.- still continues” (Nagaraj 1999: 7). It is also evident from the plans
of 1997-98 and 1998-99 that public health was not a major item in the
planning exercises. The allocation for public health was 2.93 percent (of
the total plan outlay) in the first year and 1.96 percent in the second year
(Isaac 1999).
The second move was essentially a legislative one. A Committee
on Decentralisation of Powers (known as S B Sen Committee) was set
up to suggest amendments to Kerala Panchayati Raj and Municipality
Acts, 1994 to make the decentralisation process more operational and
comprehensive. Some measures for decentralisation have already been
taken on the basis of the interim report of the committee and others are
being contemplated. As per the government order dated September 18,
1995, following the Panchayatiraj Act, the Primary Health Centres and
Government Dispensaries have been transferred to the Village
Panchayats; Block PHCs, Community Health Centres, Taluk
Headquarters Hospitals and Government Hospitals to Block Panchayats;
and CHCs, Government Hospitals and Taluk Headquarters Hospitals in
Corporation and Municipal areas to the Corporation Councils and
Municipal Councils. While the officials are under the supervision and
disciplinary authority of the local bodies during their tenure with them,
their cadre conditions remain undisturbed. Further, the government shall
continue to pay the salary, allowances and other dues to the employees
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and officers transferred to the local bodies from government. Thus, the
new system envisages dual control over the staff.
The smooth functioning of the institutions is to be ensured by the
constitution of certain committees. There are supposed to be Standing
Committee for Health and Sanitation at the level of the Municipal Council
and Municipal Corporation in the urban areas, and Block Panchayat,
and District Panchayat in the rural areas. The Standing Committees shall
deal with matters relating to public health and health service, sanitation,
environment, dangerous and offensive trades, education, arts and culture
and sports. At the District Panchayat level, a Management Committee
shall be constituted for every public health institution transferred to it by
the government.
The current situation with regard to the medical institutions is that
they have been brought under the administrative control of the LSGI.
The LSGI receive intergovernmental transfers, the criteria being
population size, area, and the proportion of SC/ST population. The Taluk
Hospitals and District Hospitals also have duly constituted Hospital
Development Committee (HDC), which collect user charges on some
services and carry out some regular maintenance, cleaning and repair.
As regards private institutions in the health care sector, registration
with the LSGI is mandatory. Unregistered private hospital or paramedical
institution may be punished. There is also provision for collecting fees
for services provided to private hospitals.
3.  Perception of Decentralisation of the Health Care Sector
Decentralisation can take place only with the understanding of
and the need for it at the level of the LSGI. In order to assess this
perception and understanding few Panchayats and Municipalities were
selected; elected members and doctors working in the PHC and Hospitals
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in these locations were interviewed to assess their understanding of the
current set up, the envisaged set up and their vision of the future.
Two districts of the state were selected and in each district one
municipal town and one or two Panchayats were selected. The districts
selected were Kasaragod and Alappuzha. The Kasaragod and Mavelikara
Municipal towns were selected for the survey. In addition, one coastal
and another interior Panchayat in Kasaragod, and a coastal Panchayat in
Alappuzha were selected. The selection was aimed at capturing the
heterogeneity in terms of economic activity, literacy and population size
and composition.
Many elected ward members and doctors working in the hospitals
were contacted and talked to individually. The common themes emerging
from these discussions are presented below.
The most important theme coming through all the discussions was
regarding the general usefulness of the decentralisation effort.
Decentralised planning is generally appreciated. It was mentioned that
LSGI received substantial funds the spending of which could be decided
by them. Corruption is thought to be less and project implementation
was considerably faster. But it was also mentioned that there was
considerable problem in co-ordinating with the line departments. Not
enough numbers of staff are available to implement projects was a theme
which repeatedly came up in Kasaragod, but not in Alappuzha.
As regards the health care sector, it was mentioned that lack of
expertise hinders preparation of projects and that as of now projects are
mostly prepared by the doctors working in the PHC or hospitals. The
projects were mostly in the nature of spraying DDT for malaria control,
medical camps, and distribution of first aid kits. Some larger guidance
and discussion would be of great help was indicated.
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As regards the working of the public medical institutions, there
were complaints of lack of proper staff deployment hindering the
functioning of medical facilities. Infrastructure available for inpatient
care is not being used owing to the absence of staff. There were also
complaints of poor service and substandard medicines and supplies. These
complaints were heard mostly in Kasargod. In these cases none of the
elected members knew how exactly to tackle the issue and the powers
they really have under the decentralised administrative system to change
the working. Despite such poor functioning, everywhere elected
representatives were advocating provision of preventive, curative and
Family Planning services through the PHC and other public medical
institutions. In Mavelikara, members talked about the Hospital
Development Committee and the ineffectiveness of its working. Their
contention is that it has been working independently of the Municipal
Council and hence ineffective. In Kasaragod, not many elected members
knew about the functioning of the HDC.
Everywhere in Kasaragod, ward members talked about the need
to introduce proper user fee, but nobody could tell us about the modalities
of it. There was also talk of cross subsidisation and exemption for the
poor, or those below the poverty line. In Mavelikara, one of the members
argued strongly against the introduction of user fee. In Kasaragod, one
of the members dismissed the whole thing as ‘public hospitals are for
the poor; why bother about them’.
Private health care sector also came up for discussion. All the
members we talked with agreed that involving private sector must be
thought of, but how is the question. Bargaining with private hospitals is
thought to be tough and there is no way private medical expenses- even
by the poor- could be reimbursed by the LSGI in their current
dispensation. In this connection one of the members in Kasargod also
expressed the need for LSGI to evolve some sort of a health insurance.
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The discussions with the doctors working in the PHC and Taluk
Hospitals revealed that after decentralisation it is not necessary to
approach the District Medical Officer for some purchases and items of
work. The LSGI could carry out many items of work; but they are not
being carried out is another story. In Kasaragod no definite motive for
not doing was mentioned but in Mavelikara it was hinted that works
which do not fetch monetary benefits to some members are not taken
up. In both the towns, there was resentment against spending scarce
municipal funds on the hospital, the services of which are used not only
by people residing within the town but also outside.
Overall, the policy issues discussed very often in the context of
health sector reforms have all come up in one way or the other in the
discussions with the members. Charging users of publicly provided health
services; some form of risk coverage; role of non-government health
care services; and greater financial and management autonomy for LSGI
have all been discussed. The most crucial of these has been the
management question, which has been posed variously as non co
operation by the line dapartments, and lack of disciplinary power, for
which no clear solutions have been suggested, or thought of. The common
problems associated with decentralisation have also come up for
discussion. Members of Municipal Councils complaining about the
services of Taluk Headquarters Hospitals being utilised by those residing
outside is the well-known problem of “benefit spill over”. The problem
with HDC is that of accountability of Municipal Councils in the presence
of pre existing institutions. A comment such as, “government hospitals
are for the poor, why bother about them” is on account of not defining
the minimum level of service for specified population groups. Each of
these problems perceived by the members and functionaries shall be
elaborated and translated into the language of decentralisation in the
next section.
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4.  The Problem of Benefit Spill  Over
The principle of decentralisation says that local governments should
generally provide services whose benefits are restricted to a single
jurisdiction. But changing service technology and improvements in public
and private transport may reconfigure the geographical spread of benefit
areas, which may not match the administrative boundaries. In such
situations spill over effects occur and intergovernmental transfers are
justified.  The services for which substantial spill over into neighbouring
jurisdictions occur, such as health and education, purely local financing
would lead to under provision of these services from a national
perspective2 .
In the current Kerala situation, where Taluk Hospitals are brought
under the Municipal Councils, spill over are very large owing to two
factors. Firstly, Kerala has a better network of roads and very high density
of motor vehicles.  Secondly, the medical institutions providing secondary
care services are largely located in municipal towns.  As regards the
network of roads (as of 1994), the road length per 100 square kilometres
is about 353 kilometres in Kerala compared to the all India average of
63 kilometres. The road length per lakh of population is 473 kilometres
in Kerala in comparison with the all India average of 245 kilometres.
The vehicle density is also very high in Kerala.  The number of buses
per lakh of population in Kerala is 105 compared to the Indian average
of 50.
2 There is another way to solve the spill over problem as spelt out by Tanzi (1995):
“... this spill over problem can in part be solved through a reciprocity rule especially
if services can be standardised across regions. In such a case the existence of the
spill over does not reduce the advantage of providing the service locally, but the
standardisation of the services eliminates one of the basic reasons for
decentralisation” ( Tanzi, 1995: 12). The standardisation option is neither feasible
nor advisable in the context of health care in Kerala as we argue later.
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Benefit spill over is not a serious problem with regard to Primary
Health care services as the distribution of Primary Health Centres (PHC)
is fairly widespread, with at least one PHC per Village Panchayat.
Whatever the Panchayat spends on the PHC would largely benefit the
residents of the Panchayat, with few exceptions3 . The problem could,
however, be quite serious with regard to the secondary health care services
accessed from the Taluk Head Quarters Hospitals, which have been
brought under the Municipal Councils.
 The seriousness of the benefit spill over may be brought out by
the following facts. The concentration ratios (share of hospital beds in
municipal towns in the total for the Taluk) for the taluks of the state
showed that in 11 taluks, over 75 percent of the hospital beds are located
in municipal towns. In 25 taluks, the ratio is between 50 & 75 percent
and in 19 taluks the ratio is below 50 percent ( Table 1). In eight out of
11 Taluks in the first group, nine out of 25 taluks in the second group,
and five out of 19 taluks in the third group, benefit spill over is not a
problem because the hospitals/ health centres are brought under the Block
Panchayat. Thus, in 33 out of the 55 taluks, for which comparable data
could be tabulated, benefit spill over is a serious problem.
The seriousness of the benefit spill over problem may also be
brought out in terms of the proportion of taluk population residing in the
municipal towns.  Out of the 33 taluks referred to above, in none is the
share of population of municipal towns above 18 percent of the taluk
population. Mostly, the municipal towns are small accounting for 10 to
15 percent of the taluk population. In these small towns are located large
3 We have also come across cases of spill over of services of PHC and the Panchayats
complaining about it.
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hospitals providing secondary care services, which are accessed by the
population of the taluk at large. Very often the Taluk Hospitals are the
only public secondary care providers for the entire taluk population, as
the PHC’s with beds provide only primary care.
Table 1. Distribution of Taluks by Concentration of Hospital Beds
in Municipal Towns, Kerala, 1997.
Concentration (%) Number of Taluks Number of Taluks
Where Spill Over
is a Problem.
>75 11 3
 50-75 25 16
<= 50 19 14
Total 55 33
Source: Government of Kerala. Government Allopathic Medical
Institutions: Kerala 1997. Directorate of Health Services,
Thiruvananthapuram.
The better transport network and the location of health care
institutions within municipal towns and the associated level of service
have given rise to spill over. The benefit leaking to residents outside
their jurisdictions has led to complaints by elected representatives and
the question often asked is, ‘why should we be spending for somebody
else’? This problem could have been addressed with a well-designed
fiscal transfer system: “Successful decentralisation cannot be achieved
in the absence of a well-designed fiscal transfer program. The design of
these transfers must be simple, transparent, and consistent with their
objectives” (Shah 1998: 149). The grant design suggested by Shah to
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compensate for benefit spillovers is “open ended matching transfers with
matching rate consistent with conditions on standards of service and
access” (Shah 1998 Table 4.7). The transfer of Plan funds as of now
takes population, area and Schedule Caste/ Schedule Tribe population
as criteria and the size of health care institution is not one of them. That
is why the conflict discussed above arises, as the local authority’s financial
resources are often not commensurate with their responsibilities.
5.  The Inequality in Access to Health Care
The system of “matching transfers “ might address the problem of
benefit spill over but it will introduce a new problem owing to
the inequality in the distribution of hospital beds across the taluks of
the state. How serious is the problem of unequal distribution of
hospital beds?
To get an idea of the inequality in distribution of hospital beds,
taluks were cross-tabulated by the number of beds per 10,000 population
and per 10 square kilometres of area (Table 2). Out of the 61 Taluks
tabulated, 17 Taluks have fewer than 7.5 beds per 10,000 population and
per 10 square kilometres area, and an additional 11 taluks have fewer
than 7.5 beds per 10 square kilometre area. The inequality in distribution
is serious enough to affect the access to secondary health care services.
The 11 taluks for which bed population ratio is above 7.5 there is
a problem of physical access as indicated by the low bed-area ratios.
The problem of physical access is especially serious, as less than 50
percent of the medical institutions in these Taluks have hospital beds.
Further, the concentration of  hospital beds (50-75 percent slab of
Table 1 ) in municipal towns is also high in these taluks. Thus, physical
access is a serious problem in 28 of the 61 taluks  listed  in Table2.
There is a striking regional dimension to the unequal distribution
of hospital beds. The 28 Taluks where physical access is comparatively
18
Ta
bl
e 2
.
D
ist
ri
bu
tio
n 
of
 T
a
lu
ks
 b
y 
Po
pu
la
tio
n-
Be
d 
R
at
io
 a
nd
 b
y 
A
re
a
-B
ed
 R
at
io
, K
er
al
a,
 1
99
7.
N
um
be
r o
f b
ed
s
N
um
be
r o
f B
ed
s p
er
 1
0 
Sq
ua
re
 K
ilo
m
et
re
 A
re
a
pe
r 1
0,
00
0
<
 5
5 
–
 
7.
50
7.
51
-1
0.
00
10
.0
1-
Po
pu
la
tio
n
<
5
Qu
ila
nd
y
K
un
na
th
ur
,
 
R
an
ni
Ti
ru
r
5.
01
-7
.5
0
A
la
th
ur
,
 
D
ev
ik
ul
am
B
ad
ag
ar
a,
 P
er
in
th
al
m
an
na
,
Pa
th
an
ap
ur
am
,
U
du
m
ba
nc
ho
la
, P
ee
ru
m
ed
u
O
tta
pp
al
am
, A
do
or
K
ot
ta
ra
kk
ar
a
K
as
ar
ag
od
e,
 H
os
du
rg
Ta
lip
ar
am
bu
Su
lta
n 
Ba
tte
ry
,
 
Er
an
ad
u
7.
51
-1
0.
00
M
an
na
rk
ka
d
Ta
la
ss
er
y,
Pa
la
kk
ad
Po
nn
an
i, 
Ch
er
th
al
a,
 C
ha
va
kk
ad
u,
N
ed
um
an
ga
du
Th
al
ap
pa
lly
M
al
la
pp
al
ly
K
ar
th
ik
ap
pa
lly
,
 A
lu
va
,
Th
iru
va
lla
, C
hi
ra
yi
nk
il,
Ch
en
ga
nn
ur
,
 
K
od
un
ga
llo
or
10
.0
1-
15
.0
0
Vy
th
iri
, C
hi
tto
or
K
un
na
th
un
ad
u,
K
ot
ha
m
an
ga
la
m
,
N
ey
ya
tti
nk
ar
a,
 K
an
nu
r,
Th
od
up
uz
ha
M
ee
na
ch
il
K
an
jira
pp
all
y,
Pa
ra
vu
r, 
K
ol
la
m
,V
ai
ko
m
,
K
oz
he
nc
he
rry
K
ut
ta
na
du
Ch
an
ga
na
ss
er
y, 
K
ar
un
ag
ap
pa
ly
15
.0
1-
M
an
an
th
av
ad
y
K
oz
hi
kk
od
e,
 T
hr
iss
ur
,
Co
ch
in
, K
ot
ta
ya
m
,
A
m
ba
la
pu
zh
a,
 M
av
el
ik
ka
ra
,
Tr
iv
an
dr
um
, M
uv
at
tu
pu
zh
a
K
an
ay
an
nu
r, 
M
uk
un
da
pu
ra
m
So
ur
ce
: S
am
e 
as
 T
ab
le
 1
.
In
di
a,
 R
eg
ist
ra
r G
en
er
al
. C
en
su
s o
f I
nd
ia
, 1
99
1,
 K
er
al
a:
 S
er
ie
s 1
2.
 D
ire
ct
or
at
e 
of
 C
en
su
s O
pe
ra
tio
ns
, K
er
al
a.
19
poor are located in the northern districts of the state, and in Idukki and
Pathanamthitta in the south. The 12 taluks, which are at the bottom of
the scale by both the criteria are all located in the northern districts, with
the thirteenth taluk, namely Adoor, falling in Pathanamthitta. Thus, the
inequality in the distribution of hospital beds has a strong north –south
dimension.
The inequality in the distribution of hospitals would affect the
access to a certain minimum level of secondary health care services. Let
us illustrate the problem with the examples of our survey locations. A
person residing on the outskirts of Mavelikara would be able to access
the services of a large hospital within 10 to 15 minutes at transport costs
of 5 to 50 Rupees (depending upon the mode of transport). Comparable
level of service would be accessible to a person residing in one of our
rural survey locations in Kasaragod only with a time delay of over one
hour at transport costs ranging from 25 to 300 Rupees depending upon
the mode of transport. In addition to the direct cost the opportunity cost
would also be very different. Thus, the issue is one of unequal physical
and economic access to a minimum level of service. This goes against
one of the basic tenets of transfers:
“Transfers may, for example, be designed to equalize
revenue effort, or expenditure levels, or outcomes in terms
of services provided. Such equalization may be desired
for purposes of income distribution, or to ensure that for
the same revenue effort, citizens obtain the same
expenditures (or outcomes) regardless of where they live,
or to provide at least minimum standards of key public
services to everyone, or to provide everyone with an equal
opportunity to access public services” (Bird and
Vaillancourt 1998: 29).
In a situation of unequal size and unequal geographical distribution
of health care institutions, one way to get over the unequal access problem
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is by transferring resources to equalize the level of services offered by
upgrading existing facilities and by setting up new facilities at proximate
locations. Then, decentralisation has no role and the state government
can take it upon itself to provide the service (ref. Footnote 2 above). The
upgradation and extension of medical facilities is not going to be easy in
a situation of fiscal squeeze.
Another way is to incorporate the private health care sector into
the system. For example in both the locations of our survey in Kasaragod,
private hospitals exist, the services of which are being used by the people.
The local Panchayat may reimburse the cost of treatment. Such an attempt
would fit in with one of the principles guiding transfers,
“The basic pronciple that should guide the design of a
system of inter governmental transfers is not to finance
particular government entities but rather to contribute to
an effective provision of services to the people” (Bird and
Fiszbein 1998: 181).
This would also be one of the ways of bringing the private health
care sector within some regulatory environment, beyond the mere
registration discussed in Section 2 above.
6.  Decentralisation in the Presence of Hospital Development
Committees
The Hospital Development Committees (HDC) came into being
since 1984 when the Government accepted the recommendations
of the High Power Committee on Health Services (Pai Committee).
The recommendation followed from the Committee’s assessment
of the functioning of Hospital Welfare and Advising Committees which
had been in existence since 1977, and Hospital Advisory Committees
earlier. The HDCs, “are envisaged as a body keeping constant vigil on
the working of the institution concerned and standing by ready to render
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whatever assistance is necessary by way of voluntary services or
financial contribution so as to meet exigencies and to ensure steady
development of the  institution” (Government of Kerala 1979). The
main objective of HDCs was to establish rapport between the public and
the staff so that hospitals function smoothly. For this purpose
democratic constitution of the Committees was underscored.
The HDCs were to have the following rights and responsibilities.
To find out defects, if any, in the amenities and functioning of the
institutions and devise ways of remedying them. To strive to maintain
orderliness and cleanliness in the institutions and their surroundings. To
organise voluntary Blood Banks and Drug Banks, public comfort stations
and bystanders’ dormitories, to run canteen and medical stores to provide
supplies at fair prices. The Pai Committee also recommended
systematisation of the user charges for medical services. The Committee
recommended the collection of full cost from the rich, 50% from the
middle class and no charge, from the low income group. The
responsibility of collecting user charges has come to be vested with the
HDCs.
As part of the decentralisation, the health care institutions have
been brought under the administrative control of the LSGI, but the only
source of local resource (in the case of the Taluk Hospital and above) is
not within its control. The HDC still collects the user charges and attends
to some regular repair, maintenance and cleaning functions. As the powers
assigned to the HDC to spend the collected resources are rather limited,
often the balance is remitted to the treasury. For example, in Mavelikara,
during 1997-98 an amount of Rupees 312386 was collected out of which
Rupees 138665 was spent and the balance amount of Rupees 173700
was remitted to the treasury. The existence of HDC goes against one of
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the basic principles of effective service provision. To be effective,  “... it
is important to ensure that those responsible for the provision of a service
have a clear mandate, resources to finance it (including, wherever needed,
own resources), and flexibility to make decisions, and are held
accountable for results” (Bird and Fiszbein 1998: 181). In the Kerala
case, none of the above conditions are satisfied. The Municipal Councils
are not provided with adequate resources to finance the health care
services; they have no access to the limited own resources collected by
the HDC; and flexibility to make decisions is lost owing to the presence
of HDC; and hence cannot be held fully responsible for results.
The HDC itself suffers from two additional handicaps. Firstly, HDC
was made a democratically constituted body by translating the political
party composition of the state legislature to each of the HDC by
nominating members of all political parties represented in the assembly.
Such translation of macro representation to the micro units has led to
several incongruities in the current context. Two examples shall suffice.
The Kasaragod Municipal Council has a number of Bharatiya Janatha
Party (BJP) members whereas the HDC has no representation for the
BJP as they are not represented in the Assembly. The Mavelikara
Municipal Council has no member belonging to the Muslim League but
the HDC has a Muslim League representative. These incongruities have
led to situations wherein elected representatives watch helplessly the
doings of nominated members undermining the emerging system.
The second problem pertains to the cost of collection of user
charges. In the Kasaragod HDC, there are three sanctioned posts of which
two have been filled. In the Mavelikara HDC there are two persons
charged with the responsibility of collecting user charges. In Kasaragod,
each is paid a daily wage rate of Rupees 60, and in Mavelikara the
payment is a monthly lump sum amount of about Rupees 600. If a regular
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administrative structure had been in place, with a regular salary at the
current minimum pay scales, the net resource availability would have
come down considerably.  Many Taluk Hospitals with lower number of
beds would have found the collections hardly enough to pay the salaries
of the HDC staff. The user charges as applicable to different income
classes have also not undergone any systematic revision over a long
period. There does not seem to exist any proper system to compute these
rates, or set income slabs qualifying for fee exemption.
The presence of HDC in a decentralised system is difficult to
sustain. Its continuance directly comes in the way of a proper functioning
and accountability of the LSGI with regard to the provision of health
care services. How exactly the functions of HDCs should be integrated
with the LSGI calls for further discussion.
7. Decentralisation of the Health Sector -Experience Elsewhere
Decentralisation of the health sector is one of the policy reforms
discussed in the Agenda for Reform (AFR) of the World Bank published
in 1987. AFR discusses decentralisation in the context of Structural
Adjustment Program and the squeeze on government expenditure. The
specific circumstance was the difficulty of attracting private health
practitioners to low income rural areas and the role of government health
care services in such areas. By decentralisation is meant granting greater
financial, and management autonomy to local units of the system.
Decentralisation gives local units greater responsibility for planning and
budgeting, for collecting user charges and for determining how collected
funds and transfers from the central government will be spent.
Decentralisation and greater local control does not mean complete
financial independence of each individual facility. Budgetary transfers
from the higher levels of government will be required. The exact mode
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of these transfers and the purposes for which they have to be used need
to be worked out carefully depending upon the country circumstances.
The decentralisation idea, as well as practice, predate the Agenda
for Reform and have a long history. We present below brief accounts of
some of them, which are relevant in the Kerala context.
China had used each of the four approaches proposed in AFR in
the Co-operative Medical System, which existed prior to the recent
liberalisation. Liberalisation of the health sector has meant privatisation
in China.  “Currently, at least 90 percent of the rural population in China
has no coverage for curative care services, which means that households
bear the entire financial costs (called medical fees in China) when they
or their families seek outpatient and inpatient care” (Chen et al., 1993:
734-5).
The Chinese state-sponsored compulsory Government Insurance
Scheme and the Labour Insurance Scheme (both introduced in 1952)
covered most urban workers. Rural residents were covered by a rural
co- operative insurance system. It did not mean direct payment by the
households. The production brigade reserved 3 to 5 percent of the total
incomes for health care and welfare funds, before distributing cash to
farmers. The “barefoot doctors” or village doctors covered their own
costs through charges to patients for curative services and drug sales.
The rural co-operative insurance system has collapsed after liberalisation:
“After the introduction of the production responsibility system, each
household  decided on its own production and received cash directly
from the market............Then, there was no cash withholding system and
no  efficient  channel  to  collect  health  and welfare funds for Co -
operative Medical System operations” (Chen et al., 1993: 733).
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Chile decentralised the government-run health system and created
private health insurance institutions in the late 1970s. Responsibility for
operating primary care services was devolved to the country’s 325
municipalities. The Ministry of Health transferred its primary care budget
and about half of its personnel to the municipalities, which could also
draw from local tax revenue and Municipal Common Fund. The
government also encouraged private health insurance funds (known as
ISAPREs). The municipalities expanded primary care services and the
ISAPREs introduced more competition.
The reforms created some problems. Initially, municipal officials
were not responsive to local needs and transfer of doctors created job
insecurity. Many municipalities lacked the capacity to plan and manage
primary health services. Because municipalities were reimbursed for each
unit of service delivered, they tended to provide too much high cost
curative care and costs exploded. The ISAPREs by targeting the richest
segment of the Chilean society have “skimmed” the population for good
risks. Since 1989, elections to the municipalities have been held so that
popularly chosen and accountable officials look after primary health care
services. Responsibility for hospitals is also being decentralised. Central
funds are being allocated on a capitation basis and adjusted to favour
poorest localities. The government is also beginning to regulate the
ISAPREs.
Colombia has three elements to the system of intergovernmental
transfers, namely situado fiscal (SF), participaciones municipales (PM)
and sistema nacional de cofinanciacion (SNC). Under SF, 24.5 percent
of the national revenue (2.7 percent of GDP in 1995) is transferred to the
departments (districts) to finance education and health in part in equal
shares and in part on a population basis. Under PM, 15 percent of the
national revenues (increasing by one percentage point to 22 percent by
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2001) (1.7 percent of GDP) is transferred to the municipalities for “social
investment” on the basis of a complex formula favouring smaller and
poorer municipalities. The formula takes into account size of the
municipalities, their location along the Magdalena River, number of
inhabitants with unsatisfied basic needs, degree of relative poverty etc.
PM transfers must be spent on “social investment” with at least 30 percent
on education, 25 percent on health, 20 percent on water and sewerage.
The SNC consists of four funds: the social investment fund; the rural
development fund; the fund for urban infrastructure; and the fund for
road infrastructure. It finances specified subnational governments that
receive transfers from the national level but also quasi- public enterprises
(that is, hospitals) and companies offering health insurance packages to
the poor.
Five distinct policy objectives are addressed with the three transfer
instruments. The first two objectives involve the provision of minimum
service levels in education and health. A third important objective is to
finance, at least in part, the cost of building the physical infrastructure
necessary to expand the coverage of key services (water, education and
health). In Colombia, arguably the principal objective of the transfer
system is to guarantee the provision of minimum service levels of
education and health to the population.
In Indonesia, since 1992, a serious attempt has been made in
decentralisation by transferring some central and provincial
responsibilities to the local level (Shah 1998: 118). The central grants
currently finance 65 percent of the expenditure at the provincial  level
and 70 percent at the district level. These transfers are of two kinds:
block grants (for general purpose local spending subject to some broad
central guidelines), to each of the three main levels of local government-
provinces, districts and villages; and specific grants for development
expenditure on roads, primary schools, public health centres, and
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reforestation. The criteria used for distribution of block grants are, area,
population and equal shares. The specific grants are transferred, on the
basis of length of road, condition of the road, and unit cost of construction
and maintenance in the case of road improvement; according to the need
for medicine, health centres and personnel in the case of health; and by
the school age children and need for facilities in the case of primary
school grant (Shah 1998: 123).
The discussion of the many cases of decentralisation of health care
sector points to a few important findings. The intergovernmental transfers
are often of the specific grant type and are with the specific objective of
providing a minimum level of service. Voluntary health insurance has
not worked very well in the two cases referred to. Reimbursement of
health care cost leads to the provision of high cost care and the explosion
of overall costs.
8. Conclusion
As every Village Panchayat in Kerala has at least one
Primary Health Care centre and a minimum level of primary care
is assured, the problem of benefit spill over is not serious at that
level. Transfer of Plan funds to the Village Panchayat by population
size, area, and SC/ST population, and payment of salary of health
personnel by the government does not create problems of unequal
distribution.
As regards secondary care, the concentration of hospital beds in
Taluk Headquarters Hospitals, and the unequal distribution of hospitals
across the taluks of the state is a given reality to be properly accounted
for. Any scheme of transfer of funds to the municipalities, which takes
due note of the size of the hospital, might solve the problem of benefit
spill over, but it will aggravate the inequality of distribution. A separate
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fund on the lines of the “social investment” fund in Colombia might
address this problem. The objective should be the provision of a minimum
level of service. Alternatively, private health care sector may be drawn
in through a reimbursement scheme. However, the danger of any
reimbursement scheme is the larger provision of high cost care, as the
Chilean experience shows.
The problem of Hospital Development Committee cannot be
wished away. The coming into being of democratically elected LSGI do
not leave any room for the existence of democratically constituted bodies
to establish rapport between the people and the health personnel. It has
to be the responsibility of the LSGI. That is the way the LSGI can be
made accountable.
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